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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Leotis Brannon Branigh, III, appeals from his judgment of conviction for first
degree murder, enhanced by the use of a deadly weapon. He asserts that the district
court erred by granting the State's motion for reconsideration and holding that the
federal Electronic Communication Privacy Act superceded Idaho Criminal Rule 41 (a),
erred by admitting unfairly prejudicial photographs of the victim's wounds, and erred by
failing to conduct a Rule 404(b) analysis of text messages admitted at trial.

He also

asserts that that the prosecutor committed misconduct, rising to the level of fundamental
error, when he argued facts not supported by the evidence during his closing argument
and that the prosecutor violated Ms. Branigh's right to due process by failing to correct
false testimony at trial. Finally, he asserts that the district court erred by denying his
motion for a new trial because Mr. Branigh establish a Brady violation, and because the
court applied the incorrect standard pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406.
This Reply Brief addresses the State's contention that suppression is not a
remedy for a violation of I.C.R. 41 (a) and that Mr. Branigh lacked standing to challenge
the search and seizure of his text messages.

It also addresses the State's

mischaracterization of Mr. Branigh's Rule 404(b) claim.

This Reply Brief is further

necessary to clarify that the record in this case demonstrates that Mr. Peak provided
false testimony at trial, which was known to be false by the prosecutor and, therefore,
the prosecutor committed misconduct in failing to correct this testimony. Additionally,
the prosecutor asserted facts nowhere in evidence, and beyond the scope of any
reasonable inference from the evidence, contrary to the State's assertion. Finally, this
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Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's contentions on appeal with regard to the
district court's disposition of Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial on both due process
grounds pursuant to Brady v. Mary/and, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and on statutory grounds
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Branigh's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1,

Did the district court err by granting the State's motion for reconsideration of its
decision that the search warrant for Mr. Branigh's cellular phone records was
unlawfully executed?

2.

Did the district court err by admitting evidence regarding all of the text messages
in this case because the district court failed to conduct an IRE 404(b) analysis?

3.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of fundamental error,
when he presented argument to the jury that was not supported by evidence
presented at trial?

4.

Did the prosecutor violate Mr. Branigh's right to due process when he failed to
correct false testimony presented by one of the state's witnesses at trial?

5.

Did the district court err, and and deny Mr. Branigh's due process right to a fair
trial, when it denied Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial based upon the Brady
violation that occurred in this case?

6.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial
pursuant to I.e. § 19-2406 because the district court failed to apply the correct
legal standards to this claim?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred By Granting the State's Motion For Reconsideration Of Its
Decision That The Search Warrant For Mr. Branigh's Cellular Phone Records Was
Unlawfully Executed
Introduction

A.

Mr. Branigh asserts that the district court properly concluded that his cellular
telephone records were inadmissible and erred in granting the State's motion for
reconsideration and concluding that 18 U.S.C.

1 et. seq. expanded the scope of an

Idaho magistrate's authority in authorizing a search warrant. Mr. Branigh contends that
the warrants were both unlawfully obtained and unlawfully executed and, thus, the
district court's initial decision to suppress the records obtained by the warrant was
correct.

This Reply Brief addresses the State's argument that suppression is not a

remedy for the alleged violations in this case and that Mr. Branigh lacks standing to
challenge the search in this case.

B.

The District Court Erred By Granting the State's Motion For Reconsideration Of
Its Decision That The Search Warrant For Mr. Branigh's Cellular Phone Records
Was Unlawfully Executed

1.

I.C.R.41(a)

The State's first argument is that, assuming I.C.R. 41 (a) was violated, such a
violation does not warrant suppression.
incorrect.

(Respondent's Brief, p.14.)

The State is

First, this Court should not consider the issue because it was not raised

below and Mr. Branigh did not have an opportunity to address the State's arguments in
the district court. Second, because I.C.R. 41 (a) serves to protect the state constitutional
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guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, suppression is the appropriate
remedy,

Further, because the magistrate had no jurisdiction to issue the warrant at

issue in this case, the warrant is void. A search conducted pursuant to a void warrant is
the equivalent of a warrantless search. And searches undertaken without a warrant and
in the absence of a valid warrant exception are subject to suppression.
This Court should refuse to entertain the State's argument. The State did not
raise this claim below and, therefore, Mr. Branigh did not have the opportunity to
address the State's claim in the district court, Very recently, in State v. Morgan,
Idaho _ , 2013 WL 275893, the Court refused to hear a claim raised by the State for
the first time on appeal. Id. at *2. In Morgan, the defendant challenged the denial of his
motion to suppress on appeal. The State conceded Morgan's claims, but argued for the
first time on appeal that a Boise City Ordinance justified the stop. Id. The Court denied
the State's motion to augment with the Ordinance on due process grounds, because
Morgan had not had a fair opportunity to present evidence with regard to the Ordinance
in the district court. Id. Thus, because the Ordinance was not before the Court, the
Court did not consider the justification for the stop. Id.
Mr. Branigh is in a similar situation here. Violations of some state statutes and
court rules can result in suppression pursuant to the Idaho Constitution, as is set forth
below.

However, because the State did not raise this claim in the district court,

Mr. Branigh did not have the opportunity to make an argument concerning state
constitutional protection. Indeed, the district court initially suppressed the evidence at
issue. (R., p.756.) When the State filed a motion for reconsideration, it did not claim
that a violation of I.C.R. 41 (a) did not justify suppression, it argued that the Electronic
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Communication Privacy Act permitted extra-territorial warrants.

(R., p.765.) Had the

State raised this claim in the district court, Mr. Branigh could have asserted protection
pursuant to the Idaho Constitution. 1

Because there was no adverse ruling from the

district court on this issue, the argument was never presented. As the only ruling from
the district court with regard to this issue was in Mr. Branigh's favor, there was no
reason to assert this claim initially.

(See R., p.756.) The only adverse ruling by the

district court on this issue was with regard to the Electronic Communication Privacy Act
and, thus, that is the claim presented on appeal.
However, if this Court does consider the State's claim, Mr. Branigh asserts that it
should consider his claim that Idaho law requires suppression for violations of state
statutes and court rules that protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. "This
Court from its earliest interpretation of Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, has held
that the right afforded individuals to protection of their persons and homes is so
fundamental as to require strict adherence to the constitutional and statutory
requirements."

State v. Mathews, 129 Idaho 865, 869 (1997).

Thus, the Idaho

Supreme Court has held that evidence obtained under an unsigned warrant was
inadmissible because the warrant did not meet the requirements of I.C. §§ 19-4401,
4406, and 4407, as well as I.C.R. 41. Id. at 870. The Court held, "failure to supply the
signature once it is challenged will vitiate any future search under the warrant." Id.
Later, in State v. Card, 137 Idaho 182, 187 (2002), the Idaho Supreme Court
stated,

Mr. Branigh did cite the state constitution in support of his motion; the issue was
simply never briefed because it was not an issue in the distort court. (R., pp.306-307.)
1
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the statutes relating to issuance, execution and returns of search warrants
supplement the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Violation of the statutory scheme in this case resulted in an
unreasonable search and seizure with respect to Card's office and home.
Suppression of the evidence is an appropriate remedy to discourage the
government agents from engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures
in violation of the state constitution. See, e.g., State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho
586, 586 P.2d 671 (1978) (evidence obtained in violation of "knock and
announce" statute held inadmissible as protected by constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure).
To be sure, not every violation of a statute or court rule will result in the suppression of
evidence.

The Idaho Supreme Court has also held that if Hle violation is just a

procedural error, suppression will not be granted See, e.

State v. Bicknell, 140 Idaho

201, 204 (2004). The violation in this case is not merely procedural; I.C.R. 41 (a) sets
forth the jurisdiction of the issuing court and prohibits the magistrate from issuing a
warrant for premises outside of its judicial district. Every procedural hurdle required by
Idaho law could have been cleared in this case and the magistrate still could not have
issued the warrant because it was without jurisdiction to do so. A warrant issued by a
magistrate without jurisdiction violates not just Idaho procedural rules but also the Idaho
Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable searches.
Finally, the fact that the warrant was issued without jurisdiction makes the
warrant void, and the subsequent search unreasonable pursuant to both the Idaho
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment.

Purported judgments entered by a court

without jurisdiction over the subject matter are void. See State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho
372, 374 (Ct. App. 2008). Idaho Courts lack jurisdiction over premises located in either
Texas or Kansas and thus any order issued from an Idaho Court to premises out of its
jurisdiction in violation of Idaho law is a nullity. If the warrant is considered a nullity, the
search conducted was the equivalent of one conducted without a warrant. Warrantless
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searches are presumptively unreasonable.

State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 370

(1989). The burden of proof rests with the State to demonstrate that the search either
fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise
reasonable under the circumstances.

State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290 (1995).

Mr. Branigh's argument in this regard is straightforward: As the issuing magistrates
lacked any authority to issue warrants outside their judicial districts, the warrants were
unlawfully obtained. When warrants are issued by magistrates without authority, they
are invalid warrants and thus searches conducted pursuant to those warrants are
unreasonable under both the federal and state constitutions.

2.

Standing

In this case, the district court concluded that Mr. Branigh had standing to
challenge the search in this case. (Tr., p.230.) The district court was correct. As the
State notes, the district court relied on Quon v. Arch Wireless Operation Company, 529
F.3d 892 (9 th Cir. 2008). While the State is correct that Quon was later reversed, it was
not reversed based on its holding regarding expectations of privacy in text messages;
indeed, the United States Supreme Court assumed, in its order reversing, that Quon
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages that he sent. See City of

Ontario, California v. Quon, _

U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 2619 (2010).

The United States

Supreme Court concluded that, assuming an expectation of privacy, the search was
reasonable. Id. at 2627-33. Thus, Mr. Branigh submits that the rationale provided by
Quon is still persuasive. That rationale is as follows:
In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the government placed an
electronic listening device on a public telephone booth, which allowed the government
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to listen to the telephone user's conversation. Id. at 348. The Supreme Court held that
listening to the conversation through the electronic device violated the user's
reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 353. In so holding, the Court reasoned, "One
who occupies [a phone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits
him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is
to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication." Id. at 352. Therefore, "[t]he Government's activities in electronically
listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he
justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and
seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 353.
The Ninth Circuit recognized that, "[o]n the other hand, the Court has also held
that the government's use of a pen register-a device that records the phone numbers
one dials-does not violate the Fourth Amendment. This is because people 'realize that
they must 'convey' phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through
telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed.'" Quon, 529
F.3d at 904 (quoting Smith v. Mary/and, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979)). The Ninth Circuit
noted that the Court distinguished Katz by noting that "a pen register differs significantly
from the listening device employed in Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the contents
of communications." Id. (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.)
The

Ninth

Circuit

also

noted

that

this

distinction

appplies

to

written

communications, such as letters. The Ninth Circuit had previously held that, it is wellsettled that, "since 1878, ... the Fourth Amendment's protection against 'unreasonable
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searches and seizures' protects a citizen against the warrantless opening of sealed
letters and packages addressed to him in order to examine the contents."

United

States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 174 (9th Cir.1978) (citing Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S.
727 (1877)); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80
L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) ("Letters and other sealed packages are in the general class of
effects in which the public at large has a legitimate expectation of privacy."). However,
as with the phone numbers they dial, individuals do not enjoy a reasonable expectation
of privacy in what they write on the outside of an envelope. See United States v.
Hernandez, 313 F.3d 1206, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Although a person has a
legitimate interest that a mailed package will not be opened and searched en route,
there can be no reasonable expectation that postal service employees will not handle
the package or that they will not view its exterior.") (citations omitted).
The Ninth Circuit then moved on to its internet jurisprudence. In United States v.
Forrester, the Ninth Circuit held that, .. e-mail ... users have no expectation of privacy in
the to/from addresses of their messages . . . because they should know that this
information is provided to and used by Internet service providers for the specific
purpose of directing the routing of information." United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d
500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, the Ninth Circuit extended the pen register and outsideof-envelope rationales to the "to/from" line of e-mails but did not rule on whether
persons have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of e-mails. Like the
Supreme Court in Smith, it explicitly noted that .. e-mail to/from addresses ... constitute
addressing information and do not necessarily reveal any more about the underlying
contents of communication than do phone numbers." Id. Thus, the Ninth Circuit
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concluded that "[t]he privacy interests in these two forms of communication [letters and
e-mails] are identical," and that, while "[t]he contents may deserve Fourth Amendment
protection ... the address and

of the package do not. Id. at 511.

The Ninth Circuit has seen no meaningful difference between the e-mails at issue
in Forrester and the text messages at issue in Quon. Both are sent from user to user
via a service provider that stores the messages on its servers. Quon, 529 F.3d at 905.
"Similarly, as in Forrester, we also see no meaningful distinction between text
messages and letters. As with letters and e-mails.itis not reasonable to expect privacy
in the information used to 'address' a text message, such as the dialing of a phone
number to send a messages." Id. "However, users do have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the content of their text messages vis-a-vis the service provider." Id. (citing
United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that defendant had a

reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages on his cell phone, and that he
consequently had standing to challenge the search)).
In Quon, the Ninth Circuit also found that it was significant that the appellants in that
case did not expect that Arch Wireless would monitor their text messages, much less
turn the messages over to third parties without their consent. Id. at 906. In this case,
Mr. Branigh submitted Sprint's Privacy Policy in support of his suppression motion. In
the section regarding disclosure of personal information, the policy states that the
company will only disclose personal information when release is appropriate to comply
with the law.

(R., pp.493, 500.)

Such an agreement only reinforces an individual's

expectation of privacy in his text messages.
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Mr. Branigh does not suggest that every search or seizure of a text message
must be done with a warrant.

The party receiving the message could, by consent,

permit the message to be read, or his phone to be seized. However, that is not what
happened in this case. See United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 418 (C.A.A.F. 1996)
("[T]he maker of a telephone call has a reasonable expectation that police officials will
not intercept and listen to the conversation; however, the conversation itself is held with
the risk that one of the participants may reveal what is said to others.") (citing Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)). Like a letter or a telephone conversation, a

person runs the risk of the receiving party disclosing the letter or the content of the
telephone call; however, that person still has a reasonable expectation that the
authorities will not intercept the letter or listen to the conversation absent a warrant.
Mr. Branigh had the same expectation of privacy in this case.

Thus, because the

search was of Mr. Branigh's records, not of messages received by others and then
disclosed with their consent, Mr. Branigh has a reasonable expectation of privacy and
thus standing to challenge the illegal search and seizure of the cellular phone records.
Further, though not directly relevant because Mr. Branigh was challenging the
search of the contents of his messages, he would likely have an ever greater
expectation of privacy pursuant to the Idaho Constitution, as Idaho has rejected Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979), and held that installation of a pen register is a

search. State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 748-49 (1988). Thus, Mr. Branigh asserts
that he would have standing to challenge the search of even the "to/from" lines from his
text messages pursuant to the Idaho Constitution.
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II.

The District Court Erred By ,A,dmitting Text Messages During Desiree Anderson's
Testimony Because The District Court Failed To Conduct An IRE 404(b) Analysis

A.

Introduction
Mr. Branigh asserts that the district court improperly admitted evidence of his text

messages without undertaking the requisite analysis under i.R.E. 404(b) as required by
law and by the district court's pretrial order in this case.

B.

The District Court Erred By Admitting Text Messages During Desiree Anderson's
Testimony Because The District Court Failed To Conduct An IRE 404(b) Analysis
Much of State's response on this issue is a mischaracterization of Mr. Branigh's

actual appellate claim. For instance, the State devotes a subsection to I.R.E 403, and
asserts that, "Branigh's assertion that the district court failed to analyze whether the
'danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence'
is plainly disproven by the record." (Respondent's Brief, p.35.) Mr. Branigh agrees that
such a claim would indeed be disproven by the record. However, no such claim was
made.
The claim actually made by Mr. Branigh was that the district court erred by failing
to conduct an IRE 404(b) analysis. See Appellant's Brief, p.35 ("[Mr. Branigh] asserts
that the district court erred by failing to recognize that these messages, many of them
quite prejudicial, fell within the scope of Rule 404(b) and by failing to determine their
relevancy outside of the presence of the jury.") While Mr. Branigh did quote from IRE
403, he did so only to cite to the entire analysis required by State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49,
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(2009). In the very next sentence, however, Mr. Branigh alleged his specific claim of
error:
In this case, the district court did not perceive the text messages as falling
within the scope of Rule 404(b) and, therefore, did not undertake the
analysis required of it by Grist. Regarding Exhibit 4, Mr. Branigh objected
on the basis of Rule 404(b). The district court stated that it had not been
cited to anything "particular for 404(b)" and overruled the objection.
(Tr., p.515, Ls.17-18.) The district court erred.
(Appellant's Brief p.36.) Mr. Branigh never claimed that the district court did not conduct
a Rule 403 analysis - he asserted that the court erred by failing to perceive that Exhibits
4 and 64 were subject to Rule 404(b).

Mr. Branigh does believe that any balancing

regarding prejudice would be flawed where the district court does not perceive the
evidence at issue to be other acts evidence, but this was not the claim raised and
Mr. Branigh did not allege that the court failed to conduct a Rule 403 analysis.
The State also asserts that the decision of the district court should be affirmed
because Mr. Branigh did not assert which messages in Exhibits 4 and 64 fell under
I.R.E.404(b). (Respondent's Brief, p.33.) However, it was Mr. Branigh's position in the
district court, and it is his position on appeal, that the entirety of both exhibits fell under
IRE 404(b). The State appears to concede as much: "In this case, the district court
admitted the state's proferred IRE. 404(b) evidence .... " (Respondent's Brief, p.36.)
Further, to the extent that the State is claiming that it was Mr. Branigh's burden to
establish which specific messages fell under IRE 404(b), the State is mistaken - it is the
State that bears the burden of establishing admissibility pursuant to IRE 404(b). See
IRE 404(b) (providing that evidence of other acts can be admissible, "provided that the
prosecution in a criminal case shall file and serve notice reasonably in advance of trial,
or during the trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the
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general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at triaL"

Thus, it is

Mr. Branigh's position that, once he objected on Rule 404(b) grounds, it was the State's
duty to justify admissibility of the evidence and the court's duty to conduct the analysis
of whether the evidence of prior conduct was relevant to a material and disputed issue
other than propensity, and whether the jury could reasonably conclude that the act
occurred and that the defendant was the actor.
Finally, the State asserts that, pursuant to State v. Cooke, 149 Idaho 233
(Ct. App. 2010), because the district court was not asked to articulate whether the act
occurred and the defendant was the actor, the district court did not err. (Respondent's
Brief, p.34.)

Cooke is very different than the instant case, however.

In Cooke, "the

State made a prima facie showing that the threats were made by Cooke in Its written
and oral offer of proof; in response to which Cooke did not to object or otherwise bring
to the attention of the trial court any potential issue that these threats were never in fact
made by the defendant."

Id. at 240.

In this case, the State made no prima facie

showing of any kind because the district court did not perceive the evidence to be Rule
404(b) evidence.

This is not a case where, following a prima facie showing, the

defendant does not place the issue in dispute. Mr. Branigh placed the admissibility of
the exhibits at issue by his IRE 404(b) objection and the district court erred by failing to
perceive the evidence as falling under Rule 404(b).
Regarding the State's claim that any error by the district court was harmless, this
Court should do what the Grist court did when it concluded that, "the district court did
not determine whether there was sufficient evidence to establish as fact Grist's prior
uncharged sexual misconduct with AW. nor did the district court articulate whether the

15

evidence was probative because it demonstrated the existence of a common scheme or
plan or because it tended to otherwise corroborate J.M.O.'s testimony."

Grist, 147

Idaho at 53. The Grist Court did not decide the admissibility of the evidence at issue in
the case; it remanded the case for the district court to make that determination on
remand. As the district court here did not decide those issues, remand is appropriate
for the district court to make that determination.
Further, the error is not harmless. The significance of the messages contained is
these exhibits is best illustrated by the fact that the State relies on them in its statement
of the case in an effort to demonstrate Mr. Branigh's guilt. (Respondent's Brief, pp.2-3.)
Many of the text messages are very inflammatory, such as statements regarding dead
bodies in old graves, asking whether Ms. Anderson's kids were out of the house,
statements about not fearing death, and "good bye heart of my heart," among many
others. (Exhibit 4). Such statements would be difficult for any jury to ignore, and thus,
Mr. Branigh asserts that the district court's error was not harmless.

III.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of Fundamental Error, By
Arguing Facts Not In Evidence During ClOSing Arguments

A,

Introduction
The prosecutor, in closing arguments in this case, argued facts that were never

placed into evidence, were not reasonable inferences from the limited evidence at trial,
and were not within the common sense or experience of the average juror.

This

improper argument went to one of the areas of greatest doubt in the State's evidence
against Mr. Branigh - i.e., the general lack of evidence connecting Mr. Branigh to any
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firearm and the failure of the State to test for gunshot residue to determine whether he
had come into contact with a firearm.

Because the prosecutor's improper argument

constituted a due process violation that was plain from the face of the record, and
because there is a reasonable possibility that this misconduct contributed to the verdict
in this case, this argument constitutes a fundamental error requiring reversal.

B.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of Fundamental
Error, By Arguing Facts Not In Evidence During Closing Arguments
The State has asserted in this appeal that the prosecutor's remarks in closing

argument regarding facts not in evidence with regard to the failure of police to conduct
gunshot residue tests does not amount to fundamental error.

(Respondent's Brief,

pp.41-44.) In support of this position, the State primarily asserts that the facts argued
by the prosecutor were primarily "reasonable inferences from the evidence," and
therefore were not improper. Mr. Branigh submits that this argument is without merit in
light of the argument of the prosecutor and the limited evidence presented at trial.
"Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law
as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's
Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010)
(emphasis added). Accordingly, it constitutes prosecutorial misconduct for a prosecutor
to refer to facts never placed into evidence at trial, or to otherwise seek to bolster the
credibility of the State's evidence through implying that the prosecutor is privy to
additional facts outside the record. See, e.g., State v. Marmentini, 152 Idaho 269, 271273 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Gerardo, 147 Idaho 22, 26-27 (Ct. App. 2009); State v.
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Martinez, 136 Idaho

1, 525-526 (2001); State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 14 (Ct. App.

1995) (prosecutor did not commit misconduct where prosecutor did "not imply that he
was privy to information corroborating the witnesses' testimony that was unknown to the
jury, or that he was personally vouching for the credibility of his witnesses").

The sole statement proffered into evidence by Detective Birdsell by way of
explanation for the lack of gunshot residue testing on Mr. Branigh's person or effects
was a single statement that, "[o]ur state lab doesn't test gun powder residue, so, no,
they were not." (Tr., p.781, Ls.20-24.) The detective did not testify that the lab did, at
one point, do such testing but then ceased the practice, as was suggested by the
prosecutor in closing arguments.

(Tr., p.1023, L.25 - p.1024, L.17.)

But, more

important for this Court, none of the evidence at trial subsumed the following "facts,"
each of which were alleged by the State in closing arguments.
There was no evidence at trial that would indicate: (1) that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ceased the practice of testing items for gunshot residue because such
tests are unreliable; (2) the degree to which gunshot residue tests have been
determined to result in "a false positive" result; (3) whether gunshot residue tests could
determine how recently an individual has had contact with a firearm; (4) whether
gunshot residue tests could indicate the type of firearm used or touched by a person; (5)
the length of time it would have taken to have results returned on DNA testing, had any
been done of the blood found at the scene; (6) the likelihood of transfer of gunshot
residue from one source to another; and (7) whether all of the police officers' weapons
would have gunshot residue that could be transferred to Mr. Branigh.
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Yet, each of

these "facts" was attested to by the prosecutor during closing arguments. (Tr., p.1023,
L.25-p.1024, L.17, p.1040, Ls.7-22.)
Nor could these assertions of fact be inferred from Detective Birdsell's statement
that gunshot residue tests were not performed at the state lab. The mere fact that one
lab does not perform a certain form of forensic testing does not, of itself, provide any
information regarding the efficacy or reliability of that test.
most notably economic ones
offered at any given facility.

Numerous other factors

could playa role in determining what type of testing is
Accordingly, the State's argument that the prosecutor's

remarks in closing argument were merely inferences from the testimony presented at
trial is without merit.
Additionally, each of the above-noted assertions levied by the prosecutor in
closing arguments is beyond the ken of an average jurors' common sense awareness.
Each of these claims was rooted in a specialized awareness of the forensic efficacy and
limitations of gunshot residue testing, which is generally a matter of scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge. See I.R.E. 702; Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 148149 (Ct. App. 2006) (remanding for an appointment of a forensic pathologist within postconviction action to assist, inter alia, with interpretation of gunshot residue evidence).
Given that the matters asserted by the prosecutor in closing arguments subsume
matters that fall within the realm expert testimony, these assertions are not merely
"common sense observations," as claimed by the State on appeal.
Finally, the trial court's instruction to the jurors that they should follow their own
memory of the evidence if it differed from that presented by the attorneys is not availing
here, where the prosecutor was arguing facts to the jury that were never admitted into
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evidence, so that the jury had no other source of information to compare with the
prosecutor's assertions. A prosecutor is not permitted to bolster the credibility of the
evidence or to rely on the implication of the existence of additional evidence, not
presented to the jury, to which only he or she has access in order to seek to sustain a
prosecution. Priest, 128 Idaho at 14.
Moreover, Mr. Branigh's questions of Detective Birdsell regarding the absence of
any testing for gunshot residue were directed at one of the greatest weaknesses in the
State's case

the general absence of evidence connecting him to any firearm. In this

case, no shell casings were found either

the scene of Mr. Johnston's shooting or in

Mr. Branigh's car. (Tr., p.733, Ls.12-16, p.740, Ls.6-9.) Likewise, police did not find a
gun on Mr. Branigh's person or within his car at the time of his arrest. (Tr., p.740, LS.69.)

Mr. Branigh's questions regarding the failure to test his person or clothes for

gunshot residue likewise highlighted the absence of any proof that would tend to show
he had any recent contact with a gun. In light of the overall weakness in the State's
evidence with regard to this issue, there is a reasonable possibility that the prosecutor's
improper presentation of facts outside the evidentiary record regarding the forensic
efficacy of gunshot residue tests contributed to the jury's verdict in this case.

IV.
The Prosecutor Violated Mr. Branigh's Right To Due Process When The Prosecutor
Failed To Correct False Testimony Presented By One Of The State's Witnesses At Trial

A.

Introduction
Contrary to the State's assertions on appeal, the record in this case

demonstrates that the prosecutor was aware, prior to the time of Mr. Branigh's trial, of
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the inappropriate relationship between Mr. Peak and Sheriff Dorion; and that the
prosecutor failed to take corrective action when Mr. Peak mischaracterized the nature of
this relationship during cross-examination at trial. There was no other evidence at trial
that would tend to inform the jury of the nature and extent of this relationship.
Accordingly, Mr. Branigh asserts that the prosecutor violated his right to due process
when he failed to correct Mr. Peak's false testimony at trial, and that the prejudice of this
violation requires reversal.

B.

The Prosecutor Violated Mr. Branigh's Right To Due Process When The
Prosecutor Failed To Correct False Testimony Presented By One Of The State's
Witnesses At Trial
With regard to Mr. Branigh's allegation that the prosecutor committed misconduct

by failing to correct false testimony from Steven Peak regarding the nature of his
relationship with then-Sheriff Jim Dorion, the State first argues that the testimony
tendered by Mr. Peak on this issue was equivocal, and therefore not clearly false.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.49-51.) Mr. Branigh submits that, when the line of questioning
that he attempted to pursue on this issue is viewed in context, the State's contention is
not supported by the record.
The State has attempted to cast Mr. Branigh's questions of Mr. Peak as being
limited to merely the question of how Mr. Peak first came to meet Sheriff Dorion, as
opposed to the nature and extent of the relationship between these two men.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.50-51.) This is not accurate. Although Mr. Branigh was not
privy to the same information as the prosecutor with regard to the extent of the
relationship between Sheriff Dorion and Mr. Peak, it is apparent that Mr. Branigh was
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attempting to cross-examine Mr. Peak as to the nature of this relationship

not merely

about how the two first met.
Prior asking him directly about his relationship with Sheriff Dorion, Mr. Branigh
questioned Mr. Peak about whether he had ever made representations that his girlfriend
had a close relationship with the sheriff, such that Mr. Peak could make use of this
relationship if he were ever in trouble with the law. (Tr., p.890, Ls.11-22.) Mr. Peak
denied this, and then characterized his girlfriend's relationship with Sheriff Dorion as
one of acquaintance. (Tr., p.890, Ls.11-22.) When asked how Mr. Peak was himself
acquainted with the sheriff, Mr. Peak responded solely that, "[Sheriff Dorion] was a
resource officer at my high schooL" (Tr., p.890, L.24 - p.891, L.2.)
Mr. Branigh's question was not when Mr. Peak first came to meet the sheriff, but
was rather a general query as to the nature of the relationship between these two
individuals.

And, as was acknowledged by Mr. Peak himself in subsequent

proceedings, the answer provided by Mr. Peak failed to accurately disclose the extent of
this relationship.

(Supp Tr., p.80, L.16 -

p.81, L.9.)

Accordingly, the State's

interpretation of this question as being one limited to the inception, rather than the
scope, of the relationship between Mr. Peak and Sheriff Dorion is not borne out by a
review of the record at trial.
In addition, the State characterizes this false testimony as one dealing with a
mere inconsistency within the evidence presented at trial, relying on the Ninth Circuit
decision in United States v. Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1135 (2002). The State cites the
Geston opinion for the proposition that inconsistent evidence, standing alone, does not
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constitute evidence of false testimony for purposes of establishing a Napue 2 violation.
(Respondent's Brief, p.51.) The State's reliance on this case is misplaced, however,
because the Geston case involved two sets of inconsistent facts that were both
presented to the jury at trial. Geston, 299 F.3d at 1134-1135. The Geston court merely
held that it was for the jury to resolve the two disparate sets of facts presented within
the witnesses' testimony.

Id.

Here, however, the jury never heard any alternate

accounting or characterization of the relationship between Mr. Peak and Sheriff Dorion.
Accordingly, the jury in this case never had the opportunity to weigh in its credibility
assessrnent the substantial evidence that Mr. Peak had a close, personal relationship
with a member of law enforcement that could have facilitated Mr. Peak's access to
police records regarding Mr. Branigh's case.
The State further argues that the record does not disclose that the prosecutor
knew, at the time of Mr. Peak's testimony, that it was false with regard to Mr. Peak's
representations of the nature of his relationship with Sheriff Dorion.
Brief, pp.51-52.)

(Respondent's

This claim is likewise not borne out by the record, as it was the

prosecutor himself who approached federal agents well before Mr. Branigh's trial with
his concerns regarding the inappropriate relationship between Sheriff Dorion and
Mr. Peak. Mr. Peak testified at Mr. Branigh's trial on December 11, 2008. (Tr., p.870,
L.1 - p.873, L.13.)

But this same prosecutor approached federal agents specifically

with regards to the inappropriate relationship between Sheriff Dorion and Mr. Peak on
November 26, 2007 - over one year prior to the testimony at issue in this appeal.
(Supp. Ex., p.11.)

2

Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
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At this meeting with Agent Douglas Hart of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the prosecutor in this case and another police officer conveyed to the agent that there
were concerns that, as an incident to his relationship with the sheriff, Mr. Peak was
given unauthorized access to law enforcement records.

(Supp. Ex., pp.11-12.)

In

addition, the prosecutor in this case relayed that he was personally informed by "a
number of people" about the "close, personal relationship" between Mr, Peak and
Sheriff Dorion. (Supp Ex., p.12.) The prosecutor also conveyed that he had received
information personally about Mr. Peak's access to the law enforcement database used
by the Lewiston Police Department. (Supp. Ex., p.12.) Other law enforcement officers
also approached the prosecutor, prior to his meeting with the FBI agent, about the
inappropriate relationship and unauthorized access to information that Sheriff Dorion
shared with Mr. Peak. (Supp. Ex., p.12.) In fact, the prosecutor in this case credited
this information to such an extent that he agreed with Agent Hart that the appropriate
course of action was to contact the Idaho Attorney General's Office and officially
request that the office look into the matter for potential prosecution. (Supp. Ex., p.13.)
Moreover, the State's argument overlooks the unchallenged findings of the
district court with regard to when the prosecutor in this case came to be aware of the
improper relationship between Mr. Peak and Sheriff Dorion. In the court's order denying
Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial, the district court found:
The information provided to the prosecutor was more than general talk or
opinions of uncertain reliability. It was instead attributable to specific law
enforcement sources about specific activities and was provided in support
of an existing and ongoing investigation. By the time the Branigh trial
commenced, the prosecutor knew the relationship between Peak and
Dorion was such that Peak could have accessed confidential police
information through Spillman or from Dorion. At the very least, the
prosecutor had direct information from law enforcement officers regarding
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the Peak/Dorion relationship and knew an investigation was being
conducted by the FBI, Idaho State Police and the Lewiston City Police
Department.
(Supp. R., p.476 (emphasis added).)
The State has not challenged the district court's findings that the prosecutor
knew as of the time that Mr. Branigh's trial commenced about the close relationship
between Mr. Peak and Sheriff Dorion, and the unauthorized access to police information
that Mr. Peak obtained as a result of this relationship.
The standard for establishing a Napue violation requires a showing that the
prosecutor either knew, or should

known, that the testimony at issue was false.

See State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 368 (Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis added).
Mr. Branigh submits that the record on appeal demonstrates that the prosecutor in this
case actually knew that Mr. Peak was rendering false testimony when he testified that
the extent of his relationship with Sheriff Dorion was that the sheriff was merely a
resource officer at Mr. Peak's school. However, given the extent of the information that
the prosecutor in this case was privy to long before Mr. Peak's trial, as well as the
gravity of concern the prosecutor expressed regarding the relationship between
Mr. Peak and Sheriff Dorion when the prosecutor met with an agent of the FBI, the
record demonstrates that - at the very least - the prosecutor should have known that
Mr. Peak's testimony at trial was false.
Finally, for the reasons set forth more fully in the Appellant's Brief, Mr. Branigh
submits that there is a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony tendered by
Mr. Peak could have affected the jury's verdict in this case. See Sivak v. State, 134
Idaho 641, 649 (2000), (see also Appellant's Brief, pp.46-47).
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V.

The District Court Erred, And Denied Mr. Branigh's Due Process Right To A Fair Trial,
When It Denied Mr. Branigh's Motion For A New Trial Based Upon The Brady Violation
That Occurred In This Case

A.

Introduction
In response to Mr. Branigh's claim of error in the district court's denial of his

motion for a new trial based upon the alleged Brady violation, the State primarily
responds that, because the district court analyzed materiality and prejudice under the
Drapeau 3 test for the statutory right to a new trial, the Brady test was met.

Underpinning the State's claim is the assertion that the second and third prongs of the
Drapeau test are the legal equivalent of the Brady test for materiality. This assertion is

in direct conflict with United States Supreme Court precedent directly on point. Unlike
the second prong of the Drapeau test, evidence can form the basis of a Brady violation
even if it is relevant solely for its impeachment value. More important for this Court, the
United States Supreme Court has rejected the notion that the materiality test under
Brady requires a showing of a probability of an acquittal - which is the threshold test for

prejudice under Drapeau. Accordingly, even if this Court were to consider the district
court's analysis of materiality and prejudice under the trial court's Drapeau analysis, this
would still show error, as the tests are legally incompatible.
The State further responds that the district court did not improperly engage in an
analysis of the legal sufficiency of the remaining evidence when it evaluated the

3

State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 785 (1976).
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materiality of the evidence wrongfully suppressed by the State. Mr. Branigh asserts that
this claim is not sustained by a review of the district court's ruling in this case.

B.

The District Court Erred, And Denied Mr. Branigh's Due Process Right To A Fair
Trial, When The Court Denied Mr. Branigh's Motion For A New Trial Based Upon
The Brady Violation That Occurred In This Case
Mr. Branigh sought a new trial in this case based upon an alleged violation by the

State of the requirement to disclose material, exculpatory evidence pursuant to Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). On appeal, he has asserted that the district court erred

in denying his motion on the basis of the alleged Brady violation.

The sale issue

disputed by the State with regard to this claim of error is whether the information that
the State failed to disclose was material to Mr. Branigh's case, thus warranting reversal.
In seeking to sustain the district court's ruling, the State first asks this court to
ignore the fact that the district court initially found all three prongs of the Brady test to
have been met, and then further seeks to transpose the district court's conclusions
regarding the statutory test for a new trial under I.C. § 19-2406(7) in place of the
findings actually made by the district court regarding the alleged Brady violation.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.58-64.) This Court should reject the State's suggestion, as the
test for materiality under Brady is expressly not the same test as that used under

I.C. § 19-2406(7) for whether a new trial is warranted.
From the outset, an initial clarification is necessary based upon the State's
argument on appeal. The State has asserted that, "the second and third requirements
for granting a motion for a new trial under Drapeau 4 (i.e., (2) the evidence is material,

The standards referenced by the State emerge from the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion
in State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 690-692 (1976). These standards apply to motions

4
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not merely cumulative or impeaching, and (3) it will probably produce an acquittal) are
equivalent to the "reasonable probability" materiality standard of Brady." (Respondent's
Brief, p.59 n.29; see also p.63.) This is incorrect on both counts.
Beginning with the second prong of the Drapeau test, which governs the
statutory right to a new trial, the strictures of Brady nowhere require that the evidence at
issue be, "material, not merely cumulative or impeaching." See State v. Drapeau, 97
Idaho 685, 691 (1976).

In fact, the Brady standards hold the opposite.

The United

States Supreme Court in both Giglio v. United States and United States v. Bagley held
that the requirements of disclosure under Brady apply with equal force to evidence that
is purely relevant for impeachment.

Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-155

(1972); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675-677 (1985).

Impeachment

evidence, for purposes of the due process requirement of disclosure by the State, is
'''evidence favorable to an accused,' so that, if disclosed and used effectively, it may
make the difference between conviction and acquittal."

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676

(internal citations omitted). Accordingly, a Brady violation - unlike a claim raised under
the Drapeau test for a new trial - may lie even where the evidence at issue has use at
trial for purely impeachment purposes.
But even more problematic, in terms of the State's conflation of the Brady and

Drapeau tests, is the difference in the legal standards for the materiality of the violation.
Under Drapeau, a defendant must show that the newly discovered evidence "will
probably produce an acquittal," in order to be entitled to a new trial under I.C. § 19-

seeking a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence pursuant to the statutory
grounds enumerated in I.C. § 19-2406(7). See State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 72
(2011 ).
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2406(7). Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691. This standard has been expressly rejected as the

test for materiality under Brady by the United States Supreme Court.
In Kyles v. Whitley, the Court expounded upon what is, and is not, required in
order to meet the test of materiality for an alleged Brady violation, following in the wake
of the Court's prior Opinion in Bagley. The Kyles Court held:
Bagley's touchstone of materiality is "a reasonable probability" of a
different result, and the adjective is important. The question is not
whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a
different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he
received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of
confidence. A "reasonable probability" of a different result is accordingly
shown when the government's evidentiary suppression "undermines
confidence in the outcome of the triaL"
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis

added).
Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has expressly rejected the State's claim in
this appeal that the test for materiality under Brady is that imposed under Drapeau i.e., that there is a probability that the evidence at issue would produce an acquittal.
It is because the test for materiality under Brady and Drapeau are entirely

different that the State's claim is unavailing when the State asserts that the district court
performed the required analysis as to materiality under Brady. In each of the instances
provided by the State in its claim that the district court performed the correct materiality
analysis, the district court was by its own evaluation actually evaluating the legal
standards for the ordering of a new trial under Drapeau. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5964.) Even if this Court were to treat the district court's analysis of whether Mr. Branigh
was entitled to a new trial under I.C. § 19-2406(7) as though it were the court's
evaluation of Mr. Branigh's claim of a Brady violation, the district court would still have
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applied the incorrect analysis to the question of whether the evidence suppressed by
the State was material.
The State's second claim, that the district court was not improperly applying a
sufficiency of the evidence test for the issue of materiality, is likewise not supported by
the record. The State denies that the district court's ruling - again with regard to the
standards articulated under Drapeau for statutory motions for a new trial - was based
on an interpretation of the materiality standard that would subsume an analysis of
whether the remaining evidence would have been sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.60-61.) However, the same quote taken from the district court's
ruling that is relied upon by the State reveals this not to be the case. After canvassing
the evidence presented by the State at trial, the district court ruled:
When the testimony of Stephen Peak is set aside, the remaining evidence
presented by the State was more than sufficient for the jury to have
reached a verdict of guilty.
Therefore, while the Court finds the
withholding of impeachment evidence a violation of Brady and its progeny,
the Court is unable to find the evidence would have likely resulted in an
acquittal had the evidence been disclosed prior to trial.
(Supp. R., pp.480-481 (emphasis added).)
The district court's analysis of the sufficiency of the remaining evidence, aside
from Mr. Peak's testimony, to support the verdict is linked by the connector, "therefore,"
to the district court's subsequent finding that the evidence would not likely have resulted
in an acquittal. Put differently, the district court was finding that the evidence would not
likely have produced an acquittal on the basis of its finding that a jury could have still
voted to convict Mr. Branigh of first degree murder under the remaining evidence. This
demonstrates the district court's belief that the prejudice test to be applied was one
rooted in whether the remaining evidence was sufficient to convict.
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This conclusion is further bolstered by the district court's ruling on Mr. 8mnigh's
motion for reconsideration.

There, after being alerted to the fact that the wrong

standard of materiality was applied to Mr. Branigh's Brady claim, the district court held:
Defendant Branigh contends the Court failed to apply the 'reasonable
probability standard that newly discovered evidence would have changed
the outcome of the jury's verdict, instead wrongly applying the standard
that the newly discovered evidence would have probably produced an
acquittal. The Court respectfully disagrees with Defendant Branigh's
reading of the Court's Opinion.
The Court addressed the newly
discovered evidence utilizing the 'reasonable probability' standard, as is
clearly noted at page 12 of the Court's opinion. The Court, after careful
review and as stated in its earlier opinion, remains of
opinion that
if
testimony
Peak was completely removed from the
record, the remaining evidence is clearly sufficient
support the
jury's verdict. In other words, the withheld evidence cannot be found
undermine confidence in the verdict.
(Supp. R., p.519 (emphasis added).)
Two things are of note in this ruling, both of which demonstrate that the district
court was of the erroneous belief that the prejudice test for the Brady violation in this
case looks to the sufficiency of the remaining evidence.

First, the district court's

remarks about the sufficiency of the remaining evidence to support the verdict in this
case were rendered directly in the context of Mr. Branigh's challenge to the district
court's failure to apply the correct standard of materiality. The State's suggestion that
the sufficiency analysis was not proffered by the court to support its finding that
materiality had not been established begs the question - to what end was the court
directing these remarks? It is apparent from the context of the court's remarks that the
trial court was applying this analysis of the remaining sufficiency of the evidence to its
earlier referenced "reasonable probability" standard.
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But an even more express indication that the district court was conflating a
reasonable probability of a different result with the sufficiency of the remaining evidence
to support a verdict of guilt can be found in the last paragraph.

Immediately after

analyzing the sufficiency of the remaining evidence, the district court stated, "In other
words, the withheld evidence cannot be said to undermine confidence in the verdict."
(Supp. R., p.519 (emphasis added).)

The district court was expressly equating its

analysis of the sufficiency of the remaining evidence with the materiality standard
required under Brady.
The United States Supreme Court expressly rejected that these two standards
are correlated.

Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434-435.

Although the district court at times

employed the language of a "reasonable possibility" of a different outcome within its
analysis, the key issue for this Court is not whether the trial court recited the correct
terms, but whether the district court correctly understood the meaning behind the terms
defining the materiality standard.

The record discloses this not to be the case.

Accordingly, Mr. Branigh respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's
order denying his motion for a new trial and remand this case for further proceedings.

VI.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Branigh's Motion For A New Trial Pursuant
To I.C. § 19-2406 Because The District Court Failed To Apply The Correct Legal
Standards To This Claim

A.

Introduction
There is no dispute in this case that Mr. Branigh also raised a motion for a new

trial under the statutory grounds provided for under I.C. § 19-2406(7).
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On appeal,

Mr. Branigh has alleged that the district court applied the incorrect legal standards in
resolving this motion. The State has alleged that this Court should review his claim
under the standards for unpreserved error as set forth in Perry.

Because the district

court actually decided Mr. Branigh's motion seeking a new trial, and because
Mr. Branigh's claim is properly subsumed as a challenge to this ruling as an abuse of
discretion for failing to follow the correct legal standards, the State's argument is without
merit.

B.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Branigh's Motion For A New Trial
Pursuant To I.C. § 19-2406 Because The District Court Failed To Apply The
Correct Legal Standards To This Claim
Mr. Branigh has asserted on appeal that the district court erred, and thereby

abused its discretion, by applying incorrect legal standards to his statutory claim for a
new trial. The State's primary response is that this Court should review this claim for
fundamental error, despite the fact that the core dispute in this case is whether the
district court applied the correct legal standards.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.65-72.)

Mr. Branigh submits that the State's claim is without merit. 5
The trial court's decision regarding a motion for a new trial is reviewed by this
Court for an abuse of discretion.

See, e.g., State v. A/marez, _

Idaho _ , _

P.3d_, 2012 WL 1948499, *19 (2012)6; State v. Egersdorf, 126 Idaho 684, 687
(1995). This Court routinely reviews claims of an abuse of discretion for whether the

While Mr. Branigh continues to assert that the district court in this case applied the
incorrect legal standards to his motion for a new trial pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406, he will
rely upon the arguments contained within his Appellant's Brief, and will not reiterate
those arguments herein. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.52-57.)
5
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district court applied the correct legal standards in reaching its result. See, e.g., State v.
Seiber, 117 Idaho 637,639-640 (Ct. App. 19S9); State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 153
(Ct. App. 1986). It is only where an issue has not been argued and decided to a trial
court that the three-part test for fundamental error from Perry applies to this Court's
review of the claim. Perry, 150 Idaho at 224-227.
Mr. Branigh's claim that the district court abused its discretion in applying the
incorrect legal standards to its adjudication of his motion for a new trial pursuant to
I.C. § 19-2406 is properly preserved and before this Court. There is no dispute, and the
State concedes in its Respondent's Brief, that Mr. Branigh raised claims of both a due
process violation pursuant to Brady, and further alleged he was entitled to a new trial
under the statutory grounds articulated in I.C. 19-2406 and case law interpreting this
provision.

Supp. R., pp.202-20S; Respondent's Brief, p.54 n.26.) Therefore, the

issue of whether the district court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal
standards to the adjudication of this claim is properly before this Court and review for
fundamental error is inapposite under these facts.
This conclusion is further strengthened by the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in
Lawrence, which found an abuse of discretion and remanded the defendant's case
based upon the district court's failure to apply the same legal standard that Mr. Branigh
has urged in this appeal. Lawrence, 112 Idaho at 151-154. In Lawrence, as here, the
district court was presented with evidence that showed that one of the witnesses at trial
recanted his prior trial testimony. Id. at 151. However, at the time of the district court's

The Idaho Supreme Court Opinion in Almarez has not yet been released for
publication in the permanent law reports as of the writing of this Reply Brief, and
therefore may be subject to revision or withdrawal.
6
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ruling, the Idaho Supreme Court had not yet issued its Opinion in State v. Scroggins,
which modified the legal test for the statutory right to a new trial where the newly
discovered evidence subsumed recantation of trial testimony. Id. at 152-153. Although
none of the parties before the trial court argued for a different standard of review based
upon newly discovered evidence of the recantation, the Lawrence court did not hold that
the legal standards from Scroggins did not apply. Instead, the Lawrence court held that
the standards from Scroggins controlled based upon the fact that these standards were
part of the legal standards applicable to the district court's exercise of discretion. Id. As
noted by the Lawrence court, "When a judge exercises a discretionary function, such as
ruling on a motion for a new trial, and in so doing he applies an incorrect legal standard,
the proper appellate response is to vacate the ruling and remand the case for
reconsideration." Id. at 153.

In this case, the district court failed to apply the correct legal standard in its
determination of Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial.

Accordingly, the district court

abused its discretion in adjudicating this motion. As such, Mr. Branigh asks that this
Court reverse the district court's order denying his motion for a new trial and remand
this case for further proceedings.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Branigh requests that his judgment of conviction be vacated and his case
remanded for further proceedings.

Alternatively, he requests that the district court's

order denying his motion for a new trial be reversed and his case remanded for further
proceedings.
DATED this 20 th day of February, 2012.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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